Cohort and Social Status Differentials in Union Dissolution: Analysis Using the 2001 General Social Survey by Ravanera, Zenaida R. et al.
PSC Discussion Papers Series
Volume 19 | Issue 9 Article 1
7-6-2005
Cohort and Social Status Differentials in Union
Dissolution: Analysis Using the 2001 General
Social Survey
Zenaida R. Ravanera
University of Western Ontario, ravanera@uwo.ca
Rajulton Fernando
University of Western Ontario, fernando@uwo.ca
Thomas K. Burch
University of Victoria, tkburch@uvic.ca
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/pscpapers
Recommended Citation
Ravanera, Zenaida R.; Fernando, Rajulton; and Burch, Thomas K. (2005) "Cohort and Social Status Differentials in Union
Dissolution: Analysis Using the 2001 General Social Survey," PSC Discussion Papers Series: Vol. 19 : Iss. 9 , Article 1.
Available at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/pscpapers/vol19/iss9/1
ISSN 1183-7284
Cohort and Social Status Differentials in Union Dissolution:
Analysis Using the 2001 General Social Survey
by
 Zenaida R. Ravanera 
Fernando Rajulton
Thomas K. Burch*
Discussion Paper no. 05-09
ravanera@uwo.ca
Tel. (519) 661-2111 ext 85151
Fax (519) 661-3200
July 6, 2005
*University of Victoria
On the web in PDF format: http://www.ssc.uwo.ca/sociology/popstudies/dp/dp05-09.pdf
Revised version of the paper presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the
Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association
University of Western Ontario, London, Canada
May 31-June 3, 2005
Population Studies Centre
University of Western Ontario
London CANADA N6A 5C2
Discussion Paper
title page verso
 1
 
A. Introduction 
 
 One of the biggest changes in the family is the increase of divorce that started to 
happen in most Western countries between 1960 and 1970. In Canada, Provencher et al. 
(forthcoming) notes that the total divorce rate of 14% in 1969 increased to about 37% in 
1982. Since then, except for slight fluctuations, the divorce rate based on years of 
marriage, in particular, ‘the proportion of marriages expected to end in divorce by the 
30th wedding anniversary’ has remained at around the same level (Statistics Canada, 
2004; 2005).  But this seeming stability of divorce rates for the country as a whole may 
be masking differences by socio-economic status of marital dissolution. The younger 
ages at marriage or cohabitation and child-bearing coupled with higher union dissolution 
translate to greater number of lone parents among the socio-economically disadvantaged. 
This is referred to as polarization of family life; that is, that disparities in social and 
economic spheres may be intensifying the differences in the experience of parenthood 
and union dissolution, which in turn result in differential development outcome of 
children (Schulze and Tyrell, 2002; Martin, 2000; Bianchi, 2000; Lochhead, 2000, 2001).   
 
 To examine the polarization in family life, we looked at the differences by social 
status in the start of parenthood and found that those with low social status do tend to 
become parents at younger ages and have greater probability than those with higher 
social status of taking a more direct route to parenthood, that is, without going through 
other life course stages such as completion of post-secondary education or marriage 
(Ravanera and Rajulton, 2004a; 2004b). In this paper, we focus on separation and 
divorce, using retrospective information on dates at experience of various family events 
gathered through the 2001 General Social Survey on Family History. These data allow 
the analysis for cohorts born from the 1920s onward. In the next section, we review 
studies on marital dissolution with particular attention to those that looked at the 
relationship of marital dissolution with indicators of social status, such as, parental and 
respondent’s education. We then discuss our survey data and methods, present the results 
of our analysis, and conclude with implications of our findings. 
 
 
B. Union Dissolution and Social Status 
 
 In a review of studies done in the eighties in the United States, White (1990: 908) 
indicates that there is a “clear inverse relationship between income and other measures of 
socio-economic status and divorce”.  It seems that this finding holds true to the 1990s; 
Bumpass et al. (1991), for example, find that both mother’s and respondent’s education 
decrease the probability of union dissolution. However, studies in European countries do 
not show such unequivocal findings. Poortman and Kalmijn (2002), for example, observe 
that in the Netherlands, the higher a woman’s education, the more likely the divorce 
whereas in Great Britain, Berrington and Diamond (1999) find that men and women with 
degree are less likely to divorce than those without. In Norway, Lyngstad (2004) finds 
that parental education is positively related to divorce whereas one’s own education has a 
negative impact.  Blossfeld et al. (1995) hypothesized, and provided empirical evidence, 
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that the differences in the relation between educational attainment and marital dissolution 
may be explained by the differences in the prevailing family system. In countries with 
more traditional family orientation (which, in their study, is represented by Italy), 
education has a stronger effect as women with higher education are more willing to go 
against prevailing social norms and are better able to deal with the consequences of 
marital disruption. But, in countries with more tolerant family system (as in Sweden), the 
relation between level of education and marital dissolution is weak. In another study, 
Hoem (1997) showed that education still mattered in Sweden with divorce risks 
increasing by level of education in the second half of the 1970s and a trend reversal by 
the end of the 1980s.  He thinks that permissive attitude to both marriage and divorce 
may have had an effect on the relation between education and marital dissolution but in 
addition, other factors mattered as well.  For instance, greater labour force participation 
of women with low education may have increased their risk of divorce; and, when higher 
education becomes more common, those who are left with low education may 
“increasingly have been losers in the marriage arena as well as the education system” (p. 
26).  
 
 As for Canada, Balakrishnan et al. (1992: 129-135) did not detect a significant 
relation between levels of education and marital dissolution in analysis using the 1984 
Canadian Fertility Survey. However, using the data from the 1990 General Social Survey, 
Hall and Zhao (1995) found that the risk of divorce increased with education.  
 
 In this study, we start by examining the trend of marital dissolution over cohorts 
to detect the kind of change over time aptly described by Lesthaeghe (1995) and van de 
Kaa (1987) as the Second Demographic Transition. Like several Western countries, the 
first stage of the Second Demographic Transition happened in Canada between 1960 and 
1970 and featured an increasing rate of divorce and the end of both the baby boom and 
the young age at marriage. Between 1970 and 1985, the prominent changes were the 
increase in cohabitation and procreation within cohabiting union. The third stage, from 
mid-1980s to the present, features the plateau of divorce and the increase of cohabitation 
among the previously married.  Even though our focus in this paper is on divorce (or 
specifically, the end of the first union), we necessarily have to bring in cohabitation and 
marriage as dissolution highly depends on the type of union entered into (Burch and 
Madan, 1986; Berrington and Diamond, 1999; Balakrishnan et al, 1992; Hall and Zhao, 
1995; Wu and Balakrishnan, 1995).  
 
 We then move on to explore the relation between social status (the indicator of 
which is explained below) and union dissolution within cohorts to detect the differentials 
that Blossfeld et al. (1995) and Hoem (1997) pointed to in Europe. As Lesthaeghe 
(1995:57) notes, there is “historical cumulativity” to the Second Demographic Transition 
in that the “changes have been prepared during earlier periods”.  We assume that the 
changes in the earlier periods would have been manifested in the behaviour of the 
innovators in older birth cohorts. These innovators would have belonged to higher social 
class (or would have had higher education) and would have had the social resources to go 
against cultural norms and the material resources to overcome the adverse outcome of 
their behaviour.  As the transition moves along, that is, as the changes become more 
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widespread and the old norms disappear, the differential by social status would vanish or 
get reversed as other factors exert their influence, and that this would be detected in the 
behaviour of the younger cohorts.  
 
 
C. Data and Methods 
 
 The 2001 General Social Survey on Family History is a country-wide survey of 
Canadians aged 15 and older, excluding residents of Yukon, Northwest Territories, and 
Nunavut and full-time residents of institutions (Statistics Canada, 2003). The survey was 
conducted by Statistics Canada with a representative sample of 24310 respondents and 
gathered information on the respondent’s family such as those pertaining to parents and 
children, about event histories of education, work, and unions through both common-law 
and marriage, and on various socioeconomic characteristics. This study uses retrospective 
information on ages at which events such as cohabitation, marriage, separation, and 
divorce were experienced.  
 
 Given the timing of the different stages of the second demographic transition 
(discussed above), we think it reasonable to assume that the oldest birth cohorts, 1926-45 
would be the “innovators” of divorce; for the 1946-65 birth cohorts (the boomers), 
divorce would have become acceptable but they would be the “innovators” of 
cohabitation; finally, for the youngest cohorts, 1966-85, both divorce and cohabitation 
would have become widespread, the experience of which no longer carries stigma or 
negative sanctions for norm violation. The analysis of trends by cohort is made by 5-year 
birth cohorts; however, for the analysis involving social status we make use of 10-year 
birth cohorts as the number of cases is small in some social status sub-groups of 5-year 
birth cohorts.   The occurrence of separation or divorce in each cohort and in each 
category of social status is the main focus of the analysis.  
 
 Two parental variables, mother’s education and father’s occupation when the 
respondent was aged 15 were used to derive the social status variable. Parental social 
status is relevant to the respondents’ early life transitions, which in turn impact on 
subsequent life events such as, divorce. We ranked mother’s education and father’s 
occupation into low, middle, and high and then combined to obtain the social status 
variable1.  Where mother’s education is missing, the measurement of social status is 
based only on father’s occupation. Where both mother’s education and father’s 
                                                          
1 Mother’s education was ranked as low (some high school or lower), middle (high school graduate or some 
post-secondary) or high (post-secondary graduate or higher). And, based on the prestige scores established 
by Goyder, Thompson, and Dixon (2003) and applied to the Standard Occupational Classification provided 
in the survey, father’s occupations was ranked as follows: Low (Sales and Services Occupations, 
Occupations Unique to Processing and Manufacturing, Occupations Unique to Primary Industry), Middle 
(Trades, Transport, and Equipment, Business, Finance, and Administrative Occupation, Artistic, Culture, 
Recreational, Sport, and Occupations in Social Sciences, Education) and High (Management Occupations, 
Natural and Applied Sciences, and Health Occupations). The two rankings were added and the final social 
status rank was assigned as follows: low (1,2), middle (3,4), high (5,6). A score of one is possible when 
information on mother’s education is missing.  
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occupation were missing, social status was imputed from the information on the 
respondent’s education and occupation, and as it turned out, almost all of them were 
assigned to either low or middle social status.  
 
 As for the methods, we constructed single-decrement life tables of union 
dissolution using SPSS by 5-year birth cohort from 1926-30 though some results are 
shown until the 1961-65 birth cohorts only, as the number of unions among the youngest 
cohorts were not numerous.  In the discussion of the results from these life tables, we 
mainly present the cumulative proportion of union dissolution by marital or union 
duration, derived from the age at the start of a union, either by marriage or cohabitation, 
and the age at separation or divorce.  
 
 Fractional sampling weights are used in all the statistical procedures as Statistics 
Canada uses complex sampling procedures for its surveys (Statistics Canada, 2003).  
 
D. Results of Analysis: Trends over Cohorts 
 
 As marital dissolution is largely determined by the type of union entered into, we 
first examined the distribution of the type of first union (Table 1). Almost everyone 
enters a first union – for women, the percentage of respondents who enter into a union 
has not changed from the oldest cohort to the 1961-65 birth cohorts with about 94% or 
higher entering a union. The corresponding figures for men are similar except for the 
younger cohorts (1956-60 and 1961-65) whose percentages might yet increase as these 
cohorts grow older. The percentages for the youngest cohorts of men and women (1966-
85) would most likely reach the same percentage as they get older. As has been 
documented in earlier studies (for example, Ravanera, 1995), Table 1 show that there has 
been a dramatic change in the type of union entered into. Whereas only 2% of women’s 
and 4% of men’s first union is formed through cohabitation among the oldest cohorts 
(1926-45), more than half of the first union of the youngest cohort (1966-85) is common-
law. The very high percentage of common-law union for the youngest two cohorts might 
change as those who have already entered into a union did so at young ages that may not 
be typical of the cohort. Those who wait to form a union at older ages might yet choose 
to go directly for marriage, though the percentage will most likely not be higher than 
those of the older cohorts.  
   
 Figures 1a and 1b reflect the general trend of rising rates of divorce, but not the 
leveling off that seems to have occurred in the late 1980’s. The cumulative proportion of 
divorce by marital duration of both men and women has continued to increase from 
oldest to youngest cohort. A refined analysis is needed to bring out the relation between 
cohort and period changes. 
 
 The cumulative proportion of union dissolution by type of first union reveals 
interesting trends over cohorts, particularly in the marital dissolution of those who first 
cohabited and then proceeded to marry. For the 1946-50 birth cohort, marital dissolution 
among those who cohabited first is markedly higher than those who went directly for 
marriage (Figures 2a and 2b). This difference has been observed in previous Canadian 
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studies, notably by Burch and Madan (1986),  Balakrishnan et al. (1987), and Hall and 
Zhao (1995), one main explanation being the selection effect; that is, those who go for 
cohabitation differs in important ways from those who marry directly, for example, in 
their orientation and values about families. Among the younger 1961-65 birth cohort, 
however, the difference in marital dissolution between those whose marriage is preceded 
by cohabitation and those who marry directly has become smaller, a possible indication 
that as common-law union becomes widespread, those who cohabit are no longer a 
“select” group.  
 
 Figures 2a and 2b also show that dissolution of common-law unions that do not 
end in marriage has not change very much from the 1946-50 to the 1961-65 birth cohorts. 
These unions are dissolved quickly, though in both cohorts about 20% of such unions 
remain intact after 15 years of union. These intact common-law unions are possibly akin 
to marriage except for the absence of formal marriage ceremony.  
 
 
E. Results of Analysis: Differences by Social Status 
 
 1. Percentage Distribution of Type of First Union and Percentage of Unions 
Dissolved.  
 
 The general trend in differences by social status in the distribution by type of first 
union and the percentages of unions ending in separation or divorce is as we expected -- 
in the older cohorts, those with high social status are more likely to divorce and more 
likely to enter into cohabiting unions but that these differences become attenuated among 
the younger cohorts (see Tables 2 and 3, in particular, the last column in both tables).  
The differences by social status in the oldest cohort (1926-45) in both cohabitation and 
marital dissolution are stronger for women than for men, possibly because women may 
have been more constrained by prevailing norms.  
 
 The differences in social status that we expected are also clearer for women. For 
marital dissolution (Table 3), the high status women have the highest percentage of 
dissolution in the oldest cohorts. For the succeeding cohorts, the boomers, the middle 
class has moved on to have the highest percentage of union dissolution. This trend stays 
until the youngest cohort (1976-85) when the differences by social status are reversed 
with those in the low status having the highest percentage of union dissolution. While this 
conforms to our expectation, the trend in the youngest cohort may not be definitive as 
those who have already formed a union in this cohort did so at younger ages and thus, 
they may not be fully representative of the entire cohort’s experience.   
 
 The trend in cohabitation of women is very similar (Table 2); that is, the higher 
the social status, the larger the percentage cohabiting. This trend continues and gradually 
diminishes with younger cohorts. Would the expected reversal in direction happen? This 
will be answered only when the cohorts not as yet included in the analysis reach 
adulthood.   
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 For men, the 1926-35 birth cohort does not show this general trend, but the 
estimates for them may not be robust as there are very few men with high social status in 
this cohort. However, the middle class men do show higher proportions who have 
cohabited or who have divorced than low status men in the oldest cohort. The estimates 
for the youngest 1976-85 cohort of men are hampered by a similar problem, that is, not 
many of them have as yet entered a union. In spite of these limitations however, the 
general trend of social status differentials and its shift in the younger cohorts is still 
discernible.  
 
 2. Marital Dissolution of Direct Marriages.  
 
 The life tables showing the cumulative proportion by social status for selected 
cohorts provide a closer look at these trends. Figures 3a and 3b show the proportion of 
marriage dissolution for women and men who married without having cohabited.  
Women with high social status in the 1926-35 birth cohort have the highest probabilities 
of dissolving their marriage, whereas for the 1956-65 birth cohort, it is the middle class 
women with the highest. For men, the estimates for high status men in the 1926-35 is 
probably best ignored as they are based on very small numbers but between the men in 
the middle and in the low status, those in the middle show higher probabilities of 
dissolution. In the 1956-65 birth cohort, men with high social status have the lowest 
probabilities of marital dissolution.  
 
 3. Union Dissolution of Marriages Preceded by Cohabitation 
 
 As for dissolution of cohabiting unions, comparison can be made only in cohorts 
with substantial numbers that have cohabited, thus excluding the oldest cohort. Further,  
for the youngest cohorts, while there may be greater numbers who have cohabited, the 
duration of such cohabitation are not long enough to allow robust estimates. Thus, for 
marriages that were preceded by cohabitation, comparison is made only for the boomers, 
the 1946-55 and 1956-65 birth cohorts. The estimates (Figures 4a and 4b) are based on 
smaller numbers than those for direct marriage and thus the lines representing cumulative 
proportions of unions are not as smooth. However, trends can be discerned and these 
seem to show a gender difference. For women, the differences by social status is similar 
to those who go directly for marriage, that is, lowest for those with high social status and 
highest for those in the middle class, though the level of dissolution is generally higher 
for those who go for cohabitation first before marriage. For men, marital dissolution is 
positively related to social status.  
 
 
 
 4. Dissolution of Common-Law Unions 
 
 The estimates of social status differences in the dissolution of common-law union 
that did not lead to marriage can be made only for cohorts that have substantial numbers 
of cohabitants for each social status, which (as seen in Table 2) are for the 1956-65 and 
1966-75 birth cohort. Figures 5a and 5b show cumulative proportion of dissolution by 
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social status for the 1956-65 cohort whose union would have been exposed to the risk of 
dissolution for a longer duration. These unions have very high dissolution rates – for 
men, more than half have been dissolved by the 5th year with the dissolution occurring at 
a faster rate for those with high social status. For those with low status, the dissolution is 
similarly high early in the union but dissolution slows down by around the 7th year. The 
trend is similar for women - the higher the social status, the higher the rate of dissolution 
with the greatest difference occurring from around the 3rd to the 7th year of union.   
 
F. Conclusion 
 
 Altered patterns of behaviour are transmitted between generations through 
socialization, and as “a process of lateral diffusion between age peers, whereby 
innovations adopted … are transmitted to others and accepted, modified, or rejected” 
(Hammel, 1990: 459).  That divorce and cohabitation have undergone this process of 
diffusion is implied by the result of our analysis. Both these behaviours seem to have 
started among those with high social status who would have had the resources to defy 
prevailing norms and to cope with the adverse outcomes of their behaviours. With the 
change in behaviour norms, formally signalled by adoption of laws governing such 
behaviour - for example, the 1968 Divorce Act, and the granting of rights to common-law 
unions similar to those of marriage in the 1980s - social control diminishes and individual 
factors exert stronger influence2.  
 
 Without identifying what the individual-level factors might be, the results of this 
analysis indicate that the concern over polarization of family life by social status may be 
warranted. The ideal modern family, with distinct division of roles of men and women 
and bonded by love and children (Shorter, 1975; Aries, 1980), has been unravelled by 
divorce and cohabitation. As yet, there is no dominant family form that has replaced this 
ideal, rather, families described by Stacey (1990: 16-19) as post-modern are formed and 
re-formed dictated by conditions affecting individuals and families. In this environment, 
those with high social status seem to be in better position to make choices that may be 
favorable to them and to their children.  For instance, common-law unions are more 
quickly dissolved among those with high social status; whereas the highest dissolution of 
marriages is among those with low social status. Those with resources – human, material, 
or social – are probably more able to stay in desirable relationship and to get out of 
unwanted relationship relatively quickly. 
 
 While there may be justification for concern over polarization of family life, this 
should be viewed in the context of social mobility as there has been a shift towards higher 
status – in Canada, the proportion of the middle class and those with high social status are 
higher in the younger than the older cohorts (Ravanera and Rajulton, 2004a.)  
 
 
 
                                                          
2 To pinpoint what these factors might be requires multivariate analysis and diffusion process modelling, 
which we plan on doing using the same set of data.  
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Number of As % of All  Common-Law Common- Total
First Respond- then Law Common-
Union ents Only Marriage Only Law
Females
1926-30 530 94.1 99.1 0.6 0.4 0.9
1931-35 571 96.0 98.2 1.2 0.5 1.8
1936-40 662 96.2 98.0 0.8 1.2 2.0
1941-45 845 95.9 96.0 2.0 2.0 4.0
1926-45 2608 95.6 97.6 1.2 1.2 2.4
1946-50 1019 95.4 90.1 4.9 5.0 9.9
1951-55 1217 95.8 77.8 14.1 8.1 22.2
1956-60 1368 95.9 69.2 16.6 14.3 30.8
1961-65 1371 94.3 59.2 20.5 20.4 40.8
1946-65 4975 95.3 72.8 14.7 12.5 27.2
1966-70 1081 89.7 54.0 20.8 27.8 48.7
1971-75 900 78.1 41.9 19.4 38.7 58.1
1976-80 511 46.6 21.9 9.4 68.7 78.1
1981-85 116 10.1 6.9 1.7 91.4 93.1
1966-85 2608 56.7 40.3 17.3 42.4 59.7
Males
1926-30 360 95.5 98.1 0.3 1.7 1.9
1931-35 427 94.3 97.7 1.2 1.2 2.3
1936-40 509 96.6 96.5 1.2 2.4 3.5
1941-45 653 96.2 92.2 3.4 4.4 7.8
1926-45 1949 95.7 95.6 1.7 2.7 4.4
1946-50 844 95.5 88.0 5.3 6.6 12.0
1951-55 915 94.0 72.5 12.8 14.8 27.5
1956-60 1026 92.2 69.0 14.0 17.0 31.0
1961-65 1082 88.9 58.1 18.3 23.6 41.9
1946-65 3867 92.4 70.9 13.0 16.0 29.1
1966-70 829 82.4 50.5 17.9 31.6 49.5
1971-75 608 65.4 40.6 16.9 42.4 59.4
1976-80 247 27.0 16.6 8.1 75.3 83.4
1981-85 54 5.9 11.1 7.4 81.5 88.9
1966-85 1738 46.1 41.0 15.8 43.2 59.0
Marriage
Table 1: Distribution by Type of First Union, By 5-Year Birth Cohort and Gender 
Source: 2001 General Social Survey
Figure 1b: Cumulative Proportion of Marriage Dissolution by Separation or Divorce 
by Marriage  Duration and  by 5-Year Birth Cohort, Males
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Figure 1a: Cumulative Proportion of Marriage Dissolution by Separation or Divorce
 by Marriage  Duration and  by Cohort, Females
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Figure 2a: Cumulative Proportion of Union Dissolution by Duration of Union 
and Type of Union, 1946-50 and 1961-65 Birth Cohort, Females
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Figure 2b: Cumulative Proportion of Union Dissolution by Duration of Union 
and Type of Union, 1946-50 and 1961-65 Birth Cohorts, Males
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High/Low
CL CL CL Ratio
N of First Marr. then CL Total N of First Marr. then CL Total N of First Marr. then CL Total of Total
Union Only Marr.  Only CL Union Only Marr. Only CL Union Only Marr. Only CL CL
Females
1926-35 654 98.6 1.1 0.3 1.4 400 98.8 0.5 0.8 1.3 47 97.9 2.1 2.1 1.5
1936-45 724 97.4 1.2 1.4 2.6 695 96.5 1.7 1.7 3.5 88 95.5 2.3 2.3 4.5 1.7
1926-45 1378 98.0 1.2 0.9 2.0 1095 97.4 1.3 1.4 2.6 134 96.3 2.2 1.5 3.7 1.8
1946-55 683 86.4 8.5 5.1 13.6 1351 83.0 10.0 7.0 17.0 200 76.5 13.5 10.0 23.5 1.7
1956-65 656 65.7 18.1 16.2 34.3 1734 64.0 18.9 17.1 36.0 348 62.4 17.5 20.1 37.6 1.1
1946-65 1339 76.2 13.3 10.5 23.8 3087 72.3 15.0 12.7 27.7 549 67.4 16.2 16.4 32.6 1.4
1966-75 367 53.1 16.6 30.2 46.9 1234 44.7 21.2 34.2 55.3 383 48.8 20.6 30.5 51.2 1.1
1976-85 81 22.2 6.2 71.6 77.8 441 18.8 8.2 73.0 81.2 105 18.1 8.6 73.3 81.9 1.1
1966-85 448 47.5 14.7 37.7 52.5 1674 37.9 17.7 44.4 62.1 487 42.3 17.9 39.8 57.7 1.1
Males
1926-35 502 98.6 0.4 1.0 1.4 251 96.8 1.2 2.0 3.2 32 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1936-45 538 93.5 3.3 3.2 6.5 559 94.6 1.3 4.1 5.4 66 92.4 6.1 1.5 7.6 1.2
1926-45 1040 96.0 1.9 2.1 4.0 812 95.1 1.4 3.6 4.9 98 94.9 4.1 1.0 5.1 1.3
1946-55 600 82.5 8.5 9.0 17.5 1000 78.6 9.3 12.1 21.4 161 77.6 11.8 10.6 22.4 1.3
1956-65 547 59.6 18.6 21.8 40.4 1257 64.4 15.5 20.1 35.6 306 66.3 14.7 19.0 33.7 0.8
1946-65 1146 71.6 13.4 15.1 28.4 2256 70.7 12.8 16.5 29.3 466 70.4 13.5 16.1 29.6 1.0
1966-75 260 47.7 15.0 37.3 52.3 906 47.7 17.0 35.3 52.3 271 40.6 21.0 38.4 59.4 1.1
1976-85 41 22.0 7.3 70.7 78.0 203 13.8 8.9 77.3 86.2 57 17.5 5.3 77.2 82.5 1.1
1966-85 300 44.3 14.0 41.7 55.7 1110 41.4 15.6 43.0 58.6 328 36.6 18.3 45.1 63.4 1.1
Source: 2001 General Social Survey
Table 2: Distribution by Type of First Union,  By Social Status, 
By 10-Year Birth Cohort and Gender,  2001 
Low Middle High
N of First Separation/ N of First Separation/ N of First Separation/ High/ Low
Union Divorce Union Divorce Union Divorce Ratio
Females
1926-35 653 13.6 400 16.0 48 25.0 1.8
1936-45 723 22.3 692 29.0 88 43.2 1.9
1926-45 1377 18.2 1091 24.3 136 36.8 2.0
1946-55 680 31.6 1347 34.5 200 35.5 1.1
1956-65 653 32.8 1730 38.2 348 31.9 1.0
1946-65 1333 32.2 3078 36.5 548 33.2 1.0
1966-75 366 25.4 1232 33.4 381 28.3 1.1
1976-85 81 37.0 441 36.1 105 25.7 0.7
1966-85 447 27.5 1673 34.1 486 27.8 1.0
Males
1926-35 502 17.5 252 21.8 32 15.6 0.9
1936-45 537 22.5 558 27.8 66 34.8 1.5
1926-45 1039 20.1 811 25.9 98 28.6 1.4
1946-55 596 32.2 996 35.3 161 29.2 0.9
1956-65 544 36.4 1256 32.5 305 31.8 0.9
1946-65 1140 34.3 2253 33.7 466 30.9 0.9
1966-75 259 30.5 905 26.3 272 30.1 1.0
1976-85 38 31.6 203 36.9 57 49.1 1.6
1966-85 297 30.6 1108 28.2 328 33.2 1.1
Source: 2001 General Social Survey
Table 3: Percentage of First Union Ending in Divorce or Separation
By Social Status, 10-Year Birth Cohort, and Gender, 2001 
Low Middle High
Figure 3b: Cumulative Proportion of Marriage Dissolution by Duration, 
by Social Status, 1926-35 and 1956-65 Birth Cohorts, 
Men Who Married Directly
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Figure 3a: Cumulative Proportion of Marriage Dissolution by Duration, 
by Social Status, 1926-35 and 1956-65 Birth Cohorts, 
Women Who Married Directly
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Figure 4a: Cumulative Proportion of Marriage Dissolution by Union Duration
by Social Status, 1946-55 and 1956-65 Birth Cohorts, 
Women Who Cohabited Before Marriage
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Figure 4b: Cumulative Proportion of Marriage Dissolution by Union Duration
by Social Status, 1946-55 and 1956-65 Birth Cohorts 
Men Who Cohabited before Marriage
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Figure 5a: Cumumlative Proportion of Union Dissolution by Duration,
 by Social Status, 1956-65 Birth Cohorts 
Women Whose Common-Law Union Did Not Lead to Marriage
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Figure 5b: Cumumlative Proportion of Union Dissolution by Duration,
by Social Status, 1956-65  Birth Cohorts 
Men Whose Common-Law Union Did Not Lead to Marriage
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